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Abstract 
Digital evidence is now common in legal cases, but the understanding of the legal fraternity as to how far 
conventional ideas of evidence can be extended into the digital domain lags behind.  Evidence determines the 
truth of an issue but its weight is subject to examination and verification through existing forms of legal 
argument.  There is a need for a practical ‘roadmap’ that can guide the legal practitioner in identifying digital 
evidence relevant to support a case and in assessing its weight.  A vital, but sometimes under estimated stage is 
that of validating the evidence before evaluating its weight.  In this paper we describe a process by which the 
validation of relevant evidence required for legal argument can be facilitated, by an interrogative approach that 
ensures the chain of reasoning is sustained.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we examine the investigative and legal processes involved in preparing digital evidence for use in 
legal argument and suggest that evidence taken at face value may be injudicious unless its validity is established 
before it can be used.  Validation requires confidence about inferences drawn from the evidence - can that 
evidence be relied upon in a legal argument?  Validating digital evidence requires verification of relevant parts 
of the digital domain where the evidence is created, processed and transferred, including the evidence file itself, 
application and operating programmes and the hardware platform.  While techniques of digital forensics aid in 
preserving and locating potential evidence from a crime scene, the extent to which this may be trusted and used 
as evidence in a particular legal argument still needs to be determined. We suggest that validation of digital 
evidence, a difficult task for the investigator, poses an even greater challenge to legal practitioners when 
constructing legal arguments.  Legal practitioners may be unaware of the full nature and significance of digital 
evidence that is more technically complex compared to conventional forms of evidence. 
 
In the past courts may have been inclined to accept the weight of digital evidence based on expediency and 
intuition, or if confused by technical issues have dismissed the case out of hand; however, there is the likelihood 
of increased legal challenges that cast doubt on the weight of the evidence in the future (Ahmad, 2002, Pospesel, 
Howard, & Rodes, 1997, Schneier, 2000, Whitman, 2005, Tapper, 2004, Whitcomb, 2002).  This is evident by 
the growth in computer-based crime that has increased reliance on digital evidence, both as partial evidence in 
otherwise conventional legal cases, or where the evidence exists entirely in digital form (Etter, 2001a, 
Thompson & Berwick, 1998, Palmer, 2001, Cohen, 2006).  Digital evidence exists in complex technical 
environments, unfamiliar territory for most legal practitioners who have difficulty determining how far 
conventional ideas of evidence can be extended into the digital domain (Etter, 2001b, Losavio, Adams & 
Rogers, 2006, Caloyannides, 2001, Edwards, 2005).   
 
Evidence used in legal cases proves facts that are in dispute and the weight that may be attached to the facts is 
examined and tested by various forms of legal argument (Anderson & Twining, 1991, Tapper, 2004).  Legal 
argument can be a complex, convoluted process taking in a broad range of evidentiary issues; technically  
complex digital evidence used in constructing compelling legal arguments makes the process significantly more 
challenging for the legal practitioner (Caloyannides, 2001, p. 3, Tapper, 2004, pp. 30-31, Mohay, 2003, Wall &  
Paroff, 2004, Yasinsac, Erbacher, Marks, Pollitt & Sommer, 2003).  Few legal practitioners have sufficient 
technical expertise to analyse digital evidence in case preparation and is difficult for them to present it in simple 
comprehensible terms to judges and juries; what may seem a potentially successful case based on 
straightforward legal argument can turn a into a needless failure (Yasinsac et al, 2003).  Moreover, developing 
legal arguments can be frustrated if unskilled use is made of the digital evidence, with unanticipated and often 
detrimental outcomes.  For example, when presenting a legal case based on what appears to be convincing 
digital evidence, the case can collapse if the defence can show that the security integrity of the network is 
defective and shows contamination or alteration of the digital evidence it is supposed to protect.  Consequently, 
if the validity of the evidence can be established its weight in legal argument is enhanced; however if its validity 
is uncertain or invalidated then weight of the evidence is diminished or negated. 
THE INVESTIGATIVE AND LEGAL DOMAINS 
Figure 1 highlights the processing of digital evidence in the investigative and legal domains.  The investigation 
domain consists of the stages taken by investigators in evidence preservation, location, selection and validation 
that precede the stages in the legal domain that involve legal practitioners constructing and then presenting legal 
arguments. This paper focuses on the validation stage, at the interface between the location and selection of 
evidence by the investigator and its subsequent use by the legal practitioner.   We examine the challenges 
presented to the legal practitioner on receipt of digital evidence and describe a process by which they may assess 
the validity of the evidence within the context of their argument. 
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Figure 1.  Evidence processing stages in the investigative and legal domains 
  
The stages of the investigation stage shown in Figure 1 commence with the evidence preservation stage that 
recognises the fragility of digital evidence.  Digital evidence can easily be altered, damaged, or destroyed by 
improper handling or improper examination and so the preservation stage attempts to stabilise and isolate the 
evidence scene to prevent contamination that damages its admissibility and weight (Ashcroft, 2001, Carrier & 
Spafford, 2003).  The location stage involves locating and identifying the digital evidence for the given class of 
crime or violation that supports or refutes hypotheses about the incident, using various technical tools and 
investigative processes to accomplish this (Carrier et al, 2003).  During the evidence selection stage the 
investigator scrutinises the evidence to determine what events occurred in the system and their significance and 
probative value to the case (Carrier et al, 2003).  
During the validation stage the evidence is tested to determine its validity, namely if the assertion drawn from 
the digital evidence can be verified.  For example, the assertion that an email message was deleted would require 
confirmation of the existence of the deleted file; that it was deleted at a specific time; that this information was 
not altered by system processes; and so forth.  Whatever security measures exist on the host computer they are 
not always helpful to the investigator as they are more often intended for auditing and monitoring of the overall 
integrity of records rather than for specifically validating digital evidence (Carrier, 2005a).  During the 
validation stage the investigator may revisit the location and selection stages to seek verification of validity 
issues and to develop new lines of investigation as circumstances dictate (Carrier et al, 2003).  
 
Inordinate amounts of time and resources are required to collect and analyse digital evidence and the sheer 
volume of the cases and the time required to process them can have a negative effect on the capacity of 
investigators - and later legal practitioners - to analyse and present a complete reconstruction of the evidence (Ó 
Ciardhuáin, 2004).  Failure to locate all available digital evidence occurs because the location of relevant 
evidence is not always evident to the untrained enquirer who may be relying solely on intuition (Cohen, 2006).  
While a technically astute and assiduous investigator can identify and analyse much relevant evidence, time 
constraints and the uniqueness of the crime scene may nevertheless produce incomplete identification of all that 
should be located, consequently denying examination and analysis of crucial facts (unamed, 2000).  Incomplete 
scrutiny of the available evidence during the validation stage of the investigative process and failure to validate 
the evidence at that point is where the investigation can fail (Cohen, 2006).  Carrier (2005a) points out that 
whatever security measures are used, they are more often used to assist in the auditing and monitoring of the 
overall integrity of records rather than directly evaluating the evidentiary integrity of digital information. 
 
False evidence too can be generated upon which unreliable arguments are propounded by those unfamiliar with 
the true nature of the digital domain (Koehler & Thompson, 2006, Diaconis, 1989).  Koehler et al  (2006) 
caution against endeavours to locate circumstantial evidence that seem to support reasonable and compelling 
argument may well be unreliable because they are purely coincidental and nothing more.  Moreover, 
investigators may miss evidence and worse still, resort to ‘cherry-picking’ when choosing or omitting evidence 
to gain legal advantage: the absence of evidence does not necessarily show evidence of absence - a common 
phenomenon of the digital domain (Koehler et al, 2006, Berk, 1983, Flusche, 2001).   
 
There is error in every analysis method and the reliability of any particular test remains an issue for forensic 
investigators (Palmer, 2002, Cohen, 2006).  A range of different factors can affect the validity of the evidence, 
including collection tools missing, failure to report exculpatory data, evidence taken out of context and 
misinterpreted, misleading or false evidence, failure to identify relevant evidence, system and application   
processing errors, and so forth (Palmer, 2002, Cohen, 2006).  Because of the complexity of the digital domain 
prosecution cases often fail during trial where incompetency is apparent in reconstructing the case and where 
validation issues are raised (Cohen, 2006).  The evidence collated and processed during the investigative stages 
is then presented to the legal practitioner who must test each piece of evidence to determine its weight in the 
legal argument and its suitability for use to prove or disprove the case (Ashley & Rissland, 1985, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). A more explicitly defined and repeatable process would be useful for the legal 
practitioner who may then have more confidence in the evidence derived during the validation stage. 
 
Research to date has focussed on providing investigators with the means to preserve, locate and select digital 
evidence (Daum & Lucks, 2005, Lenstraand & de Weger, 2005, Schneier, 2004).  For the legal practitioner, the 
research has attempted to enhance analysis of the weight of evidence as part of structuring legal arguments, but 
with limited adoption of such processes (Tillers, 2005).  Computer and network security and digital forensics 
research provides documentation about the properties of digital evidence but it does not explain in a legal 
context helpful to the legal practitioner (Spenceley, 2003, Mohay, 2003).  The validation of the evidence, 
however, is largely dependant on the skill and knowledge of investigators.   
 
There is some ongoing legal debate calling for a replacement of conventional forensic identification science that 
relies on untested assumptions
 and intuition - including digital forensics - with sounder scientific analysis (Saks 
& Koehler, 2005, Tobin & Thompson, 2006, Mohay, 2003).  Most writings on the examination and analysis of 
digital evidence focus on the preservation of evidence and the chain of evidence, with scant mention of the 
properties of the evidence itself, which may reflect the comparatively recent emergence of digital evidence and 
cyber forensics (Slade, 2004, Mohay, 2003).  Compounding this deficiency is the inefficacy of  conventional 
security processes to preserve digital evidence, for that is not their intended role  (Caloyannides, 2001, 
Rowlingson, 2004, p. 2).  Such processes are more often used as forensic tools to investigate a compromise of 
record integrity or as part of data recovery processes but do go some way towards identifying the evidence and 
reconstructing a timeline of events (Carrier, 2005a, Egan & Mather, 2004).  However, a lack of recognition and 
acknowledgement by designers, owners and custodians of digital information as to its potential evidentiary 
importance means that computer system designs fall short of protecting evidence, sometimes preventing it being 
used as key exhibits (Rowlingson, 2004, p. 2).   
 
Figure 2 lists broad areas of research and practice reported in the literature, highlighting the deficit in the area of 
validating digital evidence.   
 
Figure 2. The gap in the research and practice reported in the literature. 
Research and practice in the new field of cyber forensics is late in offering practical pedagogical models, leaving  
investigators to rely solely on their investigative skills and technical knowledge (Yasinsac at al, 2003).  For the 
legal practitioner without firsthand technical skills, some form of practical ‘roadmap’ is needed that can prompt 
him or her to identify all pertinent digital evidence relevant to a case and help assess the weight of the evidence 
more effectively.  Research attempts to help legal practitioners through such processes as computer-assisted 
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analysis of legal arguments based on evidence reconstruction, and theories including probability theory and 
inferential analysis (Silverstone & Sheetz, 2007, Huygen, 2002).  To date, however, attempts to present the 
inference processes in diagrammatic form has tended to confuse the legal practitioner rather than promoting a 
better understanding of the dynamics of digital evidence (Tillers, 2005). 
In criminal cases the prosecution, usually a law enforcement agency, has the advantage of government 
investigators with experience and resources; resources not always available or affordable to the defence: the 
defence team relies on an outline of the prosecution’s case and forensic evidence images so that it can prepare a 
defence (Mercuri, 2005).  Even with some technical help, the defence team may have little understanding of the 
properties of digital evidence and may not have clear understanding of the relationship between key digital 
evidence and potential corroborating evidence that could be used to its advantage in developing legal counter-
arguments.  In civil cases, there may be a more equitable allocation of technical expertise; nonetheless, the legal 
practitioners would still need additional help with the complexity of digital evidence.  An experienced 
investigator would be unwise to ‘second guess’ the legal practitioner but may have difficulty explaining the 
significance and relationship of the various pieces of evidence.  The legal practitioner may take the evidence at 
face value but suffer its eventual overturn by a more technically astute legal opponent.  It is during this 
validation stage that we believe the legal practitioner needs some prompting to minimise this risk. 
 
In this paper, we are concerned specifically with the validation of the evidence, rather than the subsequent 
process of interpretation.  We describe a process of methodical interrogation of the digital evidence that 
establishes whether it is valid and therefore suitable for use in legal arguments.  The process we propose also 
offers relevant prompts guiding the legal practitioner to supplementary evidence that may corroborate, negate or 
offer alternative hypotheses about the validity of the evidence.   
THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE AND LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Evidence used in legal cases may consist of witness testimony, hearsay, documents and things, and proves facts 
that are in dispute through directly proving the ultimate fact without relying on other evidence to prove any 
intervening, penultimate steps (Anderson & Twining, 1991, Tapper, 2004).  Evidence is also used to prove the 
plausibility of facts from which facts that are being disputed, may be understood - most notably, circumstantial 
evidence (Tapper, 2004).  Digital evidence shares many common features with conventional forms of evidence 
yet it is its technical properties that tend to confound the legal practitioner. 
The nature of digital evidence 
Although electronic evidence is defined as information of investigative value relating to a broad range of 
devices and data formats (Ashcroft, 2001), a formal legal definition of digital evidence is elusive, but is 
generally accepted to be information held in digital form that has some probative value (Carrier et al, 2005b, 
Pollitt, 2001).  Digital evidence typical sought in legal cases includes system logs, audit logs, application logs, 
network management logs, network traffic capture, and file system data (Sommer, 1998).   
 
Digital evidence is often considered superior to conventional paper evidence being easier to locate and process, 
and also contains useful data containing details of key dates, times and a history of the file, and, because of its 
persistency in recording key data, can provide evidence that a defendant may prefer not to exist (Caloyannides, 
2001, Janes, 2000).  Digital evidence tends to provide metadata about itself  prior to the fact, more so than 
paper-based evidence, and this can provide valuable information relating to a crime such as linking a defendant 
to an offence and showing evidence of intent, ability and opportunity leading up to the commission of the crime 
(Janes, 2000, Flusche, 2001).   
 
Several authors contend that digital evidence is not fundamentally different from conventional forms of 
evidence but is problematic because of its volatility, the complexity of the digital domain, large datasets, and 
rapid changes to technology that require current technical understanding that is certainly beyond the capability 
of most legal practitioners (Sommer, 2000, Mercuri, 2005).   
 
Other authors point out that there seems little difference between digital evidence and physical evidence as both 
forms are required to establish the commission of an offence and link the crime and the victim, or provide a link 
between the offence and the perpetrator (Carrier et al, 2003, Saferstein, 2000).  Similarly, in the digital domain 
there is much merit in using conventional, crime scene investigation techniques; again showing a degree of 
fundamental similarity between the domains.  Carrier et al (2003) provide helpful definitions to put this in better  
perspective by suggesting that the computer, computer hardware and peripherals are physical evidence, while 
the data in memory held in these devices is digital evidence.  
 
Circumstantial evidence, which includes digital evidence, is used to construct inferences that indirectly prove 
the ultimate fact in a legal case (Anderson, 1991) but before it may be admitted or given any credence in legal 
cases, it must meet additional legal conditions and conform to courtroom conventions (Caloyannides, 2001, p. 3, 
Tapper, 2004, pp. 30-31).  Circumstantial evidence is probabilistic in nature, often challenging and confounding 
observers attempting to determine the truth of an issue because the examination processes used are poorly 
defined (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, 1983, Nisbett & Ross., 1980).  Digital 
evidence is analogous to the more conventional forms of circumstantial evidence, most notably documentary 
evidence, and both forms are subject to the same degree of legal scrutiny afforded to direct evidence tendered by 
a human witness (Caloyannides, 2001, p. 3, Tapper, 2004, pp. 30-31).  
 
Inherent differences between digital and conventional evidence exist as digital evidence is more easily altered 
than conventional forms and such manipulation is sometimes not evident or even possible to detect 
(Caloyannides, 2001).  Digital evidence is mutable – it may be altered far more easily than physical records – 
and consequently is more susceptible to unauthorised manipulation, making it problematic to validate its 
admissibility and weight (Schneier, 2000, Mattord & Whitman, 2004, Akester, 2004).   
 
Inaccuracies in attribution of authorship and the content of digital evidence occur frequently and affect legal 
argument as to the completeness, correctness, validity and faithfulness to an original source, thereby raising 
doubts as to the worth of the evidence (Akester, 2004, p. 436).  More disturbing is that even in the absence of 
any obvious irregularity of the software platforms examination of any material of evidentiary value does not in 
itself attest to the accuracy or integrity of the evidence (Spenceley, 2003, pp. 130-131).  The more pessimistic 
argue that it cannot be assumed that there is a low risk of inaccuracy in computer output due to application 
failures (Spenceley, 2003, pp. 130-131).   
 
Representing legal argument 
Legal argument relies on evidence that proves or disproves a case; based on the available evidence the defendant 
is guilty or innocent of a crime.  Legal practitioners use logical chains of inferences linking one piece of 
evidence to another with the strength of each inference used to determine the weight of a case (Silverstone et al, 
2007).  The persuasiveness that flows from the combined evidence presented in a legal case is used to enable 
adjudicators and juries establish proof of guilt or innocence of the accused party (Silverstone et al, 2007).  
Further discussion of legal argument and its forms is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Legal arguments are based on logical probabilities that collectively prove the case and are constructed from the 
simplest logic possible and may be mapped, for example by a timeline of reconstructed events, or through 
inferential analysis processes (Silverstone et al, 2007).  The use of such processes displayed in graphic form 
makes the evidence collected more readily comprehensible with relevant evidence arranged as coherent discreet 
lines leading to the ultimate probandum.   
 
It is unusual for legal cases to rely solely on circumstantial evidence; direct evidence such as witness testimony 
may corroborate, refute or obfuscate whether the defendant accessed the computer, etc.  Therefore, an inferential 
analysis should include wherever possible evidence of direct evidence, physical evidence such as a fingerprint 
linking the defendant to the computer as well as the digital evidence.  Locating this supplementary evidence, 
often intuition-based, helps develop argument and strengthen the overall weigh of available evidence.   The 
weight of the evidence depends on the various relationships between penultimate probanda and the reliability of 
each probanda (Silverstone et al, 2007).   
 
Figure 3 shows a simple chain of evidence based on apparent or available evidence consisting of unprocessed 
facts from which tentative legal argument can be constructed.  
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Figure 3. Chain of Evidence: Before validation of the evidence 
 
This amount of preliminary evidence is readily comprehensible to legal practitioners but is most likely 
incomplete.  While experienced investigators may identify the less than obvious leads or seek expert advice 
where their technical expertise fails, explaining the complexity of the digital evidence located to the legal 
practitioner may be difficult.  If the investigator is diligent, has sufficient technical and investigative expertise 
and skills, and is dedicated to seeking all relevant evidence then the legal practitioner will be well served.  But 
the legal practitioner must be able to determine whether enough evidence has been located and whether the 
validity of the digital of evidence has been satisfactorily described and determined. 
 
A PROCESS FOR VALIDATION OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
The interrogation process 
Figure 4 outlines the basic validation interrogation process where exhibit B, taken from the chain of evidence 
example in Figure 3 requires validation.   
 
Figure 4. Chain of Evidence: Showing the validation process of digital evidence exhibit “B”. 
 
A series of prompts determines if the evidence is valid.  Each prompt requires a response of ‘yes’ (the evidence 
can be considered valid), ‘no’ (the evidence is invalid) or ‘unclear’, (suggesting that further explanation should 
be considered).  The “yes” and “no” outcomes are considered definitive, the “yes” indicating that the evidence 
can be retained and a “no” indicating that the evidence should be rejected.  An “unclear” result is inconclusive 
and requires a further explanation to provide clarification to establish if the evidence is valid.  Where further 
explanation continues to be inconclusive, a decision to terminate the process is required and at that point, the 
expertise of the legal practitioner will be required to retain or to reject the evidence based on the available 
validation evidence. 
 
Each piece of digital evidence considered for inclusion in legal argument is judged on the weight of inference of 
at least one assertion used, for example, whether the existence of the deleted email file does infer the view that 
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there was an attempt to conceal evidence.  In other words, an assertion claims deliberate deletion of the email 
file with intent to remove all trace of the evidence.  As evidence-based assertions are contestable, it is critical to 
establish their validity.   
 
Figure 5 shows a graphic decomposition of assertions provided by a digital evidence exhibit and the systematic 
process required to determine its validity.  Each assertion is evaluated to determine whether it is confirmed or 
negated by other available evidence.  Each circle in Figure 5 represents an assertion underpinning the evidence, 
for instance “the defendant accessed a file on a computer”.  The primary assertion 1 requires confirmation or 
negation, provided by the secondary assertions 2 and 3.  For example “the deleted email file existed” requires 
validation.  The file metadata may or may not confirm the assertion and the assertion the metadata provides may 
itself need further confirmation by other assertions and so forth until the interrogation is considered sufficiently 
strong to support the primary assertion.  
 
Figure 5. Decomposition of the evidence through validation process 
 
Figure 6 shows an example of a chain of evidence where the evidence has been validated. 
Figure 6. Chain of evidence: After validation of digital evidence exhibit “B” is achieved. 
Conversely, the primary assertion may be negated from the outset or at a later point, breaking the chain of 
evidence as shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
The chain of 
evidence is 
broken
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “A”
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “B”
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “C”
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “D”
 
Assertion 
“1”
Assertion 
“3”
Assertion 
“2”
Assertion 
“4”
Assertion 
“5”
Assertion 
“7”
Assertion 
“6”
Confirmed by Negated by
Confirmed by Negated by
Confirmed by Negated by
The chain of 
evidence is intact
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “A”
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “B”
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “C”
Digital 
Evidence 
Exhibit “D” 
 
Figure 7. Chain of evidence: After validation of digital evidence exhibit “B” is negated. 
 
Example 
We present a hypothetical case to demonstrate the validation process.  Consider a case involving a defendant 
accessing a computer and sending a threatening email to another party, then deleting the email in an attempt to 
conceal the evidence on the computer.  A neighbour witnessed the defendant inside the room at the time of the 
suspected offence, and police recovered the defendant’s and other persons’ fingerprints from the computer 
keyboard, as shown in Figure 8.    
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Figure 8. Hypothetical case showing digital, human and physical evidence 
 
If we look at one piece of the evidence, that the file was deleted, it would be prudent to find out the processes 
involved and whether it was possible to link the date and time of the deletion to the defendant’s known presence 
in the room.  In our hypothetical example, we seek explanations about key properties of the file evidence.  We 
need to find out the nature of the pertinent evidence, in this case the email application properties and from that, 
attempt to validate the date and time of the file deletion, and then view the outcomes of that examination. 
 
If we decompose the hypothetical case, it shows that the validation of the evidence can be a lengthy and 
complex process.  In Figure 9 we examine the deleted file and drill down through each sub-set of evidence that 
provides assertions attesting to the validity of the evidence at the higher level.  We expect to reach a conclusion 
that is acceptable in the legal practitioner’s opinion as validation of the primary assertion corroborated by 
supporting evidence.  
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Figure 9. Hypothetical case decomposition showing the validation of assertions 
 
 
Figure 10 shows an alternative path in which the decomposition established that the evidence was invalid 
through the absence of corroborating evidence at the fourth secondary assertion. 
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Figure10. Hypothetical case decomposition showing the invalidation of assertions 
   
 
Figure 11 shows an alternative scenario where an anomaly existed about the validity of email file metadata 
matching the time of the suspected deletion.  This required further explanation confirming modification of the 
metadata by virus scanning activity.   
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Figure 11.  Hypothetical case decomposition showing the validation of assertions by drilling 
down through negative assertions 
 
Further explanation showed that the virus scanning activity did not alter the actual date and time of deletion of 
the email file and thus validity is sustained.  This scenario emphasises the importance of searching for evidence 
that negates an assertion as well as seeking confirmation. 
 
Although potentially many questions about the evidence exist in our hypothetical and relatively simple example, 
the number of questions may increase exponentially in complex cases.   The process of decomposing the 
original hypothetical evidence uncovered additional evidence clarifying the truth of the original bland assertion 
about the file deletion.  While this was a positive outcome, one path of validation did identify a negative 
assertion but this was later nullified by other evidence, thus demonstrating the complexity of the digital domain. 
 
Using the decomposition of the simulated result in Figure 11 the chain of evidence gained more pieces of 
validated evidence to replace the simple assertion that a deleted file existed.  The decomposition ended with the 
assertion confirming the validity of the creation date of the deleted file and for the sake of brevity, we have not 
decomposed the process further.  So, accepting the new evidence, the chain of evidence may be modified with 
validated evidence that is also more complete as shown in Figure 12. 
 
The validation process described has identified a possible weakness in the evidence regarding a critical time, the 
date and time of the file deletion.  It is an important part of the legal argument to be able to state categorically 
the exact time of deletion, but future counter-argument can be dispelled because it can be shown that only partial 
modification occurred which does not weaken the assertion about the deletion time.  The process has validated 
the evidence providing clarification that allows the legal practitioner to gain a far greater understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the evidence available.   
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Figure 12. Hypothetical case: modified chain of evidence after validation 
 
The search for validation shown in the hypothetical example assumes that the enquirer has both investigative 
and technical skills but the legal practitioner may be unable to know what questions to ask to test the validity of 
the evidence.  In the next section we describe how we may assist the legal practitioner in seeking relevant 
information by providing prompts at each step of the process.  
 
An interrogation checklist 
To assist the legal practitioner, it is useful as part of the validation interrogation process to provide prompts that 
firstly provide explanation about the properties of digital evidence, and secondly alert the legal practitioner 
when further validation of the digital evidence is prudent.  Providing an interrogation checklist of digital 
evidence properties that offers a suite of prompts would enable the legal practitioner to make more discerning 
judgement on the weight of evidence knowing that is has been validated or invalidated, or needs more research 
to a point of reasonable termination of endeavour.   
 
An interrogation checklist, which supplements the validation interrogation process, supplies prompts to direct 
enquiry to seek facts confirming or negating the validity of the evidence.  The enquirer has two options, to seek 
confirmation of validity or to seek negation.  These two options offer separate search patterns for the legal 
practitioner who may seek validation of incriminating evidence, or wishes to develop an alternative hypothesis 
as part of a counter-argument.  We suggest that this system has the advantage of being more inclusive because it 
would cover a broader range of potential evidence overlooked in the selection and validation stages of the 
investigation process shown in Figure 1. 
 
Table 1 provides a small example of the proposed checklist based on the hypothetical case.  A set of categories - 
“subject”, “assertion”, several “prompts” and “known issues” – guides the legal practitioner to identify and 
locate corroboratory evidence to validate each piece of evidence.  Using the example of the hypothetical case, 
the email is the subject of the validation process and the occurrence of file deletion, the assertion.  The first 
prompt provides the enquirer with a list of file locations to commence a search.  The second prompt suggests 
what tool should be used, such as the email application, and the third prompt provides a range of information 
that should be sought with the tools suggested and at the location suggested.  The fourth prompt suggests 
conditions that could assist in validating the assertion.   
 
 
  
Subject Assertion  Prompt 
Where to search? 
Prompt 
How to search? 
Prompt 
What to seek? 
Prompt 
How do we know if 
: Yes / No / 
Unclear? 
Known issues 
Email  [Email 
was] 
Copied 
Application  Search tool  Metadata  Date/time match  Metadata can 
be falsified  
No date/time match 
Date/time missing 
[Email 
was] 
Deleted 
Email trash  Application  Metadata Date/time  match  Retention 
affected by 
storage 
limitations 
No date/time match 
Date/time missing 
Recycle bin  Windows 
Explorer 
 or  
 Forensic tool 
File contents  Intact  File can be 
overwritten 
Not evident 
Part missing 
Intact  File can be 
unrecoverable 
Not evident 
Part missing 
File header  Intact  File can be 
overwritten 
Not evident 
Part missing 
Intact  File can be 
unrecoverable 
Not evident 
Part missing 
Drafts  - ditto -  - ditto -  - ditto -  - ditto - 
Table 1. Checklist entries showing prompts to assist in validating an email file deletion 
 
In this sample, the assertion can be checked against the metadata of the email file to compare the data and time 
available with the known time of the offence.  This prompt provides “Date/time match”, “No date/time match”, 
and “Date/time missing”.  The final column “Known issues”, provides supplementary information about 
previously identified validation issues.  
 
Subject Assertion  Prompt 
Where to 
search? 
Prompt 
How to search? 
Prompt 
What to seek? 
Prompt 
How do we know if 
: Yes / No / 
Unclear? 
Known issues 
Deleted 
email 
metadata 
Falsified  Inside the file 
properties table 
Application Authorship 
details 
Present  Not possible to 
detect manual 
alteration of 
the properties 
using the 
parent 
application  
Not present 
Cannot resolve if 
present  
The hard drive   
 
 
Forensic tool 
File attribute 
modification 
application 
Traces of  the 
application 
No traces of the 
application 
Unclear if traces of 
the application 
Inside the 
application 
Other copies of 
the file 
Metadata match 
Metadata mismatch 
Metadata irregular 
Table 2. Checklist entries relevant to the metadata of an email file.  
 
The information supplied through Table 1 may still be an inconclusive result but will provide additional prompts 
to direct further searches in a different part of the checklist to locate more information to assist the validation  
process.  This is shown in Table 2 where a series of further prompts point to possible scenarios that may relate to 
the deleted email file.  The validation prompt offers an extra suite of prompts such as “metadata mismatch” or 
“traces” and so forth. 
 
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to develop fully the checklist we plan further research to test its 
feasibility and usefulness to the legal practitioner and possibly investigators in validating digital evidence.  
Formulating a database of digital evidence properties that can link back to the evidence in a given context would 
be especially useful in enhancing understanding of the evidence validation in a wide range of cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have presented a practical process that can assist legal practitioners in validating digital evidence through a 
process of guided questioning.  We suggested that the process can be supported by a checklist of appropriate 
prompts, and presented a hypothetical example of how the questioning and checklist of prompts might be used 
in practice.  We suggest that such a process could be of great value to legal practitioners as it makes explicit a 
vital stage in the investigation of digital evidence that can easily be overlooked or underestimated.  Further 
research is planned to progress the checklist further, with the aim of developing a generic model based on an 
ontology of the digital evidence field.  Research will also focus on developing an appropriate representation for 
the process, so that it is usable as a practical tool for legal practitioners in validating digital evidence. 
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